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  Begin your report below this inst
Abstract 
A human-in-the-loop experiment was conducted with 15 retired air traffic controllers to investigate two 
research questions: (a) what procedures are appropriate for the use of unmanned aircraft system (UAS) detect-
and-avoid systems, and (b) how long in advance of a predicted close encounter should pilots request or execute 
a separation maneuver. The controller participants managed a busy Oakland air route traffic control sector 
with mixed commercial/general aviation and manned/UAS traffic, providing separation services, miles-in-trail 
restrictions and issuing traffic advisories. Controllers filled out post-scenario and post-simulation 
questionnaires, and metrics were collected on the acceptability of procedural options and temporal thresholds. 
The states of aircraft were also recorded when controllers issued traffic advisories. Subjective feedback 
indicated a strong preference for pilots to request maneuvers to remain well clear from intruder aircraft rather 
than deviate from their IFR clearance.  Controllers also reported that maneuvering at 120 seconds until closest 
point of approach (CPA) was too early; maneuvers executed with less than 90 seconds until CPA were more 
acceptable. The magnitudes of the requested maneuvers were frequently judged to be too large, indicating a 
possible discrepancy between the quantitative UAS well clear standard and the one employed subjectively by 
manned pilots. The ranges between pairs of aircraft and the times to CPA at which traffic advisories were 
issued were used to construct empirical probability distributions of those metrics.  Given these distributions, 
we propose that UAS pilots wait until an intruder aircraft is approximately 80 seconds to CPA or 6 nmi away 
before requesting a maneuver, and maneuver immediately if the intruder is within 60 seconds and 4 nmi. These 
thresholds should make the use of UAS detect and avoid systems compatible with current airspace procedures 
and controller expectations. 
 
I. Introduction 
Unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) will equip with detect-and-avoid (DAA) systems that meet the regulatory 
requirement for pilots to “see and avoid” other aircraft.  These systems must alert pilots of impending encounters early 
enough to allow them to determine and execute the appropriate action, but not so early that they cause disruption to 
air traffic control (ATC) plans and priorities.  While a significant amount of recent research has investigated the 
minimum time required by the pilot to execute the DAA function,i,ii,iii,iv,v little objective data is available that indicates 
the earliest time pilots should contact ATC to avoid intruder aircraft. The DAA system may alert a pilot to a potential 
close encounter whenever such an encounter is predicted, and pilots prefer as much warning time as can be reliably 
provided, so the pilot’s needs will not provide a reasonable upper limit to the alerting horizon threshold. The ATC-
acceptable alerting time therefore drives the maximum time at which to alert pilots, which in turn dictates minimum 
surveillance sensor requirements. The maximum alerting horizon is therefore a critical and fundamental parameter in 
the design of a DAA system. 
Several prototype DAA systems are under development or undergoing flight tests, but none have used ATC 
acceptability to establish an upper limit to the alert time provided to the pilot.  The only parameters established for the 
separation standard between UAS and other aircraft include the range to proximate aircraft such that pilots of those 
aircraft do not feel unsafe, interoperability with the traffic alert and collision avoidance system (TCAS), and 
interoperability with established ATC procedures.vi  Only the last of these establishes an upper bound to the alerting 
time; the others provide a lower bound.  Quantifying “interoperability” with ATC is a challenge because that concept 
incorporates many competing goals in many different contexts,1 but the notion of traffic advisories and safety alerts 
is useful in bounding the alerting thresholds.  Controllers issue traffic advisories (TA) to IFR and VFR2 aircraft when, 
in their judgment, “proximity may diminish to less than the applicable separation minima.” Typically these advisories 
are issued well before safety has been compromised and are intended to cue the pilot to visually acquire the other 
aircraft and determine whether evasive action will be required.  A safety alert (SA) is issued when “an aircraft is in a 
                                               
 
 
 
1 For example, pilots must provide a separation assurance function that augments air traffic controllers’ provision of 
separation, but they must not employ it so frequently that they distract controllers or create secondary close encounters 
with proximate aircraft. 
2 Instrument flight rules (IFR) and visual flight rules (VFR) 
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position that … places it in unsafe proximity to … other aircraft.”vii  An SA represents an imminent threat to safety 
that requires immediate action by the pilot and is typically issued by a controller only a few times over an entire career. 
The normal process by which a manned aircraft pilot would employ their see-and-avoid capability, and therefore what 
a controller would expect a UAS pilot to do when using their DAA system, is to receive a TA, decide appropriate 
action based on their own visual or sensory inputs, coordinate those actions with ATC and then maneuver before an 
SA is required.  The first alert time for a DAA system, therefore, should be somewhat later than the time at which a 
typical TA is issued but well enough in advance of an SA that appropriate maneuvers make such an alert unnecessary.  
No prior work is known that establishes the factors and thresholds used by controllers to determine whether and when 
to issue an alert or advisory.   
The contribution of the research presented in this paper is quantification of the conditions under which air traffic 
controllers issue TAs along with subjective feedback on how long before a close encounter it is appropriate for a pilot 
to request a maneuver.  A human-in-the-loop experiment involving 15 retired air traffic controllers supplied the 
required data. The distribution of times and distances at which the controllers issued TAs may be used in combination 
with other airspace and encounter parameters to determine the earliest time at which pilots should request avoidance 
maneuvers from air traffic controllers.  They may be alerted to potential encounters before this threshold, but they 
should refrain from contacting ATC until the threshold because intervention and resolution of the encounter by ATC 
is still likely enough that immediate action is not required. The data presented in this paper should be used to determine 
an appropriate self-separation threshold (defined in more detail in the following section) that does not disrupt ATC 
operations and provides sufficient time for pilots to remain well clear of proximate aircraft. 
This paper describes the experimental setup of the study of air traffic controller behavior in the following section.  
It then presents the subjective feedback received from controller participants about the appropriateness of three 
different candidate self-separation thresholds.  A second section on results presents the distribution of temporal and 
geometric parameters that characterize when TAs are issued.  Finally, the paper provides recommendations for the 
factors that should be used to determine a self-separation threshold and suggests threshold times and distances that 
should be validated by future studies. 
II. Experiment Setup 
This section outlines key details of the experiment design and infrastructure used to collect the controller 
acceptability and traffic advisory data.  It also describes the qualifications of the experiment participants, the traffic 
scenarios they were presented with and the training they received to ensure the simulation closely represented real-
world conditions. 
A. Independent Variables 
The experiment included two independent variables: the UAS self-separation procedure and the threshold time at 
which pilots requested or executed a self-separation maneuver. This threshold is referred to as the "request/maneuver 
threshold" because it reflects the time at which the pilot would either request an intruder-avoidance maneuver from 
ATC or execute a maneuver and notify ATC afterwards. In essence, this is the first time at which ATC becomes aware 
that the UAS pilot intends to use the DAA system.  This threshold is a new one defined for this experiment and is 
distinct from the UAS community's accepted definition of the self-separation threshold (SST), which is the point at 
which the pilot determines a maneuver is necessary, or the self-separation execution threshold (SET), which is the last 
point at which the UAS can maneuver to remain well clear. The request/maneuver threshold would lie in between 
these two thresholds.  The specification of this new threshold is important because it provides a way to link the ATC 
acceptability metric to the time required by the pilot to determine an appropriate maneuver (after the SST) and before 
a loss of well clear is guaranteed (before the SET).  
The UAS self-separation procedures designed for this experiment require either coordination with ATC prior to a 
maneuver (Option A), or allow maneuvering without an amended clearance after crossing the request/maneuver 
threshold, assuming a prior traffic advisory from ATC has not been received (Option B).  Lacking a controller-issued 
traffic advisory, the request/maneuver threshold defines the point in time the UAS pilot would either request  
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an amended clearance from ATC (Option A), or initiate an avoidance maneuver and subsequently notify ATC (Option 
B).  In either case, if the controller did issue a traffic advisory prior to the SST, the pilot was instructed to immediately 
request an amended clearance using either a prototype DAA system or a scripted maneuver. These procedures are 
presented in detail in Appendix I. Three threshold values were included in the experiment: 60, 90 and 120 sec.  This 
range was selected based on the results of prior pilot-in-the-loop studiesii,iii that indicated the lowest value would not 
be enough time to reliably avoid a loss of well clear, while the largest value was deemed to be plenty of time by all 
pilots. The larger value was also expected to impact controller workload because it would overlap and interfere with 
the controller’s separation actions. 
B. Apparatus 
The experiment employed human air traffic controller subjects and pseudo-pilot participants in a simulated air 
traffic environment. The air traffic controller subjects ("controllers") of the experiment were located in the NASA 
Crew-Vehicle Systems Research Facility's (CVSRF) ATC Laboratory (ATC Lab) as shown in Figure 1.  The 
controllers provided standard ATC services using controller stations similar to the Display System Replacement 
(DSR) consoles used in Air Route Traffic Control Center (ARTCCs) in the domestic U.S. air traffic system.xi 
Controllers communicated with pilot confederates via voice communications using an interface similar to that used in 
ARTCCs. The live, virtual, constructive, distributed simulation environment (LVC-DE) architectureviii employed by 
Figure 1. Air traffic control lab at NASA's Crew-Vehicle Systems Research Facility. 
Figure 2. Network functional architecture of the LVC-DE. 
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the simulation was distributed across two NASA facilities as depicted in Figure 2. A more detailed system architecture 
diagram is shown in Appendix G.  
Pseudo-pilot confederates in the experiment were located at NASA ARC; each controlled multiple aircraft through 
an interface optimized for ATC simulations called the multi-aircraft control system (MACS). These pseudo-pilots 
control the movement of both conventional (manned) aircraft and unmanned aircraft in the simulation.  Aircraft 
movement is simulated by MACS using 4 degree of freedom (position/velocity and roll) performance models for all 
aircraft types.ix,x The MACS pilot interface allows the pseudo-pilot to control multiple aircraft simultaneously and to 
respond to air traffic instructions for each aircraft in a timely manner. 
A single UAS Ground Control Station, called Vigilant Spirit Control Stationix (VSCS), was located at NASA’s 
Armstrong Flight Research Center (NASA-AFRC) and used to simulate the flight of one UAS in the simulated 
environment to a higher degree of fidelity than the MACS pseudo-pilot interface provided.  The VSCS simulates an 
aircraft with performance characteristics similar to that of the General Atomics Predator B.  Voice communications 
between the VSCS pilot and controllers, as well as computed VSCS states, are distributed to the other simulation 
agents via the LVC-DE gateway. 
As depicted in Figure 2, the LVC-DE consolidates information from the simulated agents (controller stations, 
MACS pseudo-pilot stations, and VSCS) and routes relevant information and communications to the appropriate 
receiving agents.  For example, if the VSCS pilot commands a right turn for his aircraft and notifies ATC via voice 
that he has turned right for traffic, the turn would be reflected in the aircraft position as computed by VSCS, and that 
position, along with the preceding voice communication, would be sent to the LVC-DE.  The LVC-DE would route 
the voice communications between the VSCS pilot and ATC to all aircraft on the simulated ATC frequency, and the 
computed position of the VSCS would be appropriately updated on both ATC and pseudo-pilot displays. 
C. Simulation Participants 
The controller subjects employed in the experiment were recently retired air traffic controllers from U.S. ATC 
facilities.  Demographic information was collected from the controller subjects via a questionnaire (Appendix D).  
Controller subjects had on average 26 years of experience controlling traffic, primarily at ARTCC facilities and with 
some limited experience at TRACON facilities. Eleven of the fifteen controller subjects had experience controlling 
UAS at some point during their careers. 
The pilots of the VSCS ground control station were active UAS pilots with at least 100 hours experience flying in 
domestic controlled airspace (i.e. not in military operations areas or other restricted airspace).  They and the pseudo 
pilots controlling all other traffic were also current IFR-rated pilots and therefore were experienced in the procedures 
and phraseology used to communicate with the controller subjects. 
D. Airspace 
Controller subjects provided standard air traffic services to pilots of simulated aircraft operating in Oakland 
ARTCC Sectors 40 and 41 (ZOA40/41), which are shown bounded by a red polygon in Figure 13.  ZOA 40/41 is an 
ARTCC sector just north of the San Francisco Bay, comprised of Classes A and E airspace, and includes moderate to 
high levels of IFR and VFR air traffic.  Commercial air transport operations in the sector follow mostly North-South 
routes into and out of the SFO-OAK-SJC metroplex: northbound traffic climbing or level, and southbound traffic level 
or descending.  ZOA 40/41 serves two Class D airports: Sonoma County Airport (KSTS) and Napa County Airport 
(KAPC). Crossing (east-west) IFR traffic is common with aircraft going to/from Reno/Tahoe. VFR traffic is common 
in ZOA 40/41 due to its proximity to San Francisco, the Northern California coastline and the Napa and Sonoma 
valleys (all popular sightseeing destinations).  Travis Air Force Base RAPCON borders ZOA 40/41 to the east and 
introduces a significant number of UAS operations into the experiment airspace.  
E. Traffic Scenarios 
Four scenarios were generated from air traffic recordings and modified to represent a range of typical conditions 
encountered by controllers managing air traffic operating in ZOA 40/41.  Air traffic consisted of both conventional 
(manned) and unmanned IFR traffic, as well as VFR traffic that would typically be present in ZOA 40/41.  VFR traffic 
in each scenario exhibited three levels of “participation” consistent with current air traffic operations: 1) equipped 
with an operating transponder and receiving air traffic services, 2) equipped with an operating transponder, but not 
receiving air traffic services, and 3) without an operating transponder and not receiving ATC services (also called a 
“primary target”).  Each scenario was augmented with UAS flights to model future operations with frequent and 
sustained UAS activity.  Flight tracks were adjusted (temporally and/or spatially) to result in ten scripted encounters 
between IFR and VFR aircraft in each scenario.  Of these ten encounters, five were between conventional (manned) 
aircraft and VFR aircraft, and five were between unmanned aircraft and VFR aircraft.   
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Controller workload (subjectively) varied within and between scenarios from light/moderate to heavy, but was 
always designed to be high enough to reduce the controllers’ ability to provide additional ATC services (e.g. traffic 
advisory service).  Traffic loading alone was typically sufficient to achieve this purpose in each scenario, but increased 
traffic or airspace complexity was sometimes necessary to meet the intended level of controller workload.  Some 
controller subjects exhibited greater proficiency in managing air traffic, primarily due to a priori knowledge of ZOA 
40/41 procedures.  These controllers were identified in training (prior to data collection), and increased complexity 
was introduced as necessary in the form of miles-in-trail restrictions for SFO arrivals. 
F. Subject/Participant Instructions and Training 
The controller subjects received a briefing (Appendix E) each morning that included a concise background and 
summary of NASA’s UAS Integration into the NAS Project, an overview of study objectives, and instructions for 
provision of ATC services during the simulation as well as methods of data collection for the study and a daily schedule 
of activities.  Only two of the study objectives were briefed prior to data collection: 1) improving NASA air traffic 
simulation fidelity, and 2) gathering data to develop controller models for subsequent batch simulations.  Controller 
subjects were not informed in advance of the objective to evaluate different UAS self-separation procedures as 
knowledge of this objective was deemed to potentially affect controller performance and influence responses to post-
run questionnaires.   Instructions for controllers in this briefing were limited to those relating to the briefed objectives, 
including treating the simulation as actual operations to maximize the fidelity of the study and improve data quality, 
and noting any inconsistencies or issues with the simulation to dedicated experiment observers. 
At the conclusion of the summary briefing controller subjects received training to become familiar with the study 
airspace, air traffic flows, traffic management initiatives, and phraseology for provision of ATC services to UAS 
operating in the airspace.  This training included an airspace/procedures briefing as well as a series of practice sessions 
to familiarize controller subjects with aspects of the simulation facility and to ensure proficiency in the provision of 
ATC services.  Practice sessions were conducted until the experiment director subjectively assessed proficiency in the 
airspace as adequate for the purposes of the study.  During these training sessions, the experiment director also 
assessed the need for additional, workload-increasing measures in each scenario.  This additional step was done to 
roughly equalize workload across controller subjects with varying levels of proficiency and to ensure that controller 
workload was sufficient to impact additional ATC services (i.e., traffic advisories).  For example, subjects who showed 
higher proficiency were tasked with sequencing aircraft into the TRACON airspace at a minimum “miles in trail” 
distance from preceding aircraft. 
G. Experiment Design 
The simulation used to collect data on the acceptability of UAS detect-and-avoid alerting thresholds was also 
designed to gather data related to other experimental objectives on UAS operations.  The overall simulation setup and 
Figure 3. Experiment airspace, Oakland ARTCC sectors 40 and 41. 
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design has been documented in a companion paper.xi  The design documented in this section only addresses those 
aspects of the experiment design related to the stated objectives of this study.  In particular, it presents the independent 
and dependent variables and their associated metrics that address the primary objective of evaluating ATC 
acceptability of UAS self-separation procedures and maneuver thresholds.   
A self-separation procedure (Option A or B) was assigned for each of the aforementioned ten scripted encounters 
in a scenario.  These scripted encounters and their associated self-separation procedure were included in a scenario 
script provided to each pseudo-pilot for reference during the course of each simulation run (see Appendix I).  The 
pseudo-pilots followed scenario-specific scripts according to the instructions provided on how to execute the 
procedures during the course of the experiment (Appendices I and K).  
A range of parameters was recorded during each simulation run to objectively measure aspects of the UAS DAA 
system's performance, the traffic controller's performance and their interactions.  Subjective assessment from 
controller subjects is also sought because air traffic controller acceptability is difficult to quantify for new concepts or 
types of operation, as is the case with UAS self separation.  Metrics collected during each simulation run are classified 
into three categories: encounter data, traffic advisory data, and simulation artifact data. 
Traffic advisory data is collected to improve controller performance modeling in batch simulations and help 
determine when controllers expect pilots to begin monitoring and avoiding intruders.  The ability of the controller to 
identify developing encounters between IFR and VFR aircraft under moderate to high workload will determine 
whether or not a UAS crosses the SST and begins to use its DAA system, and even potentially crosses the 
request/maneuver threshold or SET.  The following three traffic advisory metrics were collected during each 
simulation run: 1) time to CPA (Tcpa) and relative geometry (range, bearing, relative altitude) at which a traffic advisory 
is issued, 2) the predicted CPA that necessitated a TA, and 3) whether a TA was issued prior to the aircraft crossing 
the SST. 
All the aforementioned metrics were collected during the course of a scenario.  Following each scenario, subject 
controllers completed a questionnaire intended to evaluate controller acceptability of the tested self-separation 
procedures and the request/maneuver thresholds for the scenario just completed, and to provide context and 
clarification for the objective measures.  The post-run and end-of-day controller questionnaires (Appendices B and C, 
respectively) provided subjective assessment of the UAS self-separation procedure acceptability, traffic complexity 
and controller workload, and revealed to the controller subjects the third objective of the study relating to controller 
acceptability and recognition of objectionable pilot behavior.   
A balanced experimental design (Table 1) ensured that the independent variables were presented to subjects in an 
order that balanced learning and scenario workload effects across procedure types, pilots and alerting thresholds.  The 
actual number of encounter samples collected in each condition varied between subjects because controllers did not 
systematically issue the same traffic advisories in each condition, though in the aggregate the number of encounters 
across the experimental conditions were quite similar.  The codes in Table 1 are defined in Table 2.  
. 
 
Table 1. Independent variables by controller and trial. 
Controller # Trial 1 Trial 2 Trial 3 Trial 4 
1 LO, UNC, C1 HI, CRD, C3 LO, CRD, C2 HI, UNC, C4 
2 HI, CRD, C3 LO, UNC, C1 HI, UNC, C4 LO, CRD, C2 
3 LO, UNC, C2 LO, UNC, C1 HI, CRD, C3 HI, UNC, C4 
4 HI, UNC, C3 LO, CRD, C1 HI, CRD, C4 LO, UNC, C2 
5 LO, CRD, C1 HI, UNC, C3 LO, UNC, C2 HI, CRD, C4 
6 HI, UNC, C3 HI, CRD, C4 LO, UNC, C2 LO, CRD, C1 
7 LO, UNC, C2 LO, CRD, C1 HI, CRD, C4 HI, UNC, C3 
8 LO, UNC, C1 LO, CRD, C2 HI, UNC, C4 HI, CRD, C3 
9 HI, CRD, C4 LO, UNC, C2 LO, CRD, C1 HI, UNC, C3 
10 HI, UNC, C4 HI, CRD, C3 LO, CRD, C2 LO, UNC, C1 
11 LO, UNC, C2 HI, CRD, C4 HI, UNC, C3 LO, CRD, C1 
12 LO, CRD, C2 HI, UNC, C4 HI, CRD, C3 LO, UNC, C1 
13 HI, CRD, C3 HI, UNC, C4 LO, UNC, C1 LO, CRD, C2 
14 HI, UNC, C4 LO, CRD, C2 LO, UNC, C1 HI, CRD, C3 
15 LO, CRD, C1 LO, UNC, C2 HI, UNC, C3 HI, CRD, C4 
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Table 2. Independent variable condition codes. 
Experiment Condition Code 
high scenario complexity HI 
low scenario complexity LO 
75% of scenario's encounters use procedure A, 25% B CRD 
75% of scenario's encounters use procedure B, 25% A UNC 
Traffic scenario C# 
 
III. Results 
The following two sections present subjective data on the primary independent variables: the two self-separation 
procedural options and the three request/maneuver temporal thresholds.  The last two sections present objective 
metrics on the relative aircraft states at which controllers issued traffic advisories, first in relation to the independent 
variables and then as part of an analysis that could be used to predict when a traffic advisory would be issued.  
Knowledge of when traffic advisories are normally issued is useful because when a controller issues an advisory it is 
then appropriate for the pilot to determine whether the intruder poses a potential safety threat and request a maneuver 
if it does. Controllers were unanimous on this point. 
A. Subjective Evaluation of Self-Separation Procedures 
One of the principal objectives of this study was to determine the acceptability to controllers of procedures in 
which the pilot did or did not obtain an amended clearance for a self-separation maneuver before executing that 
maneuver.  Although measuring this level of acceptability was difficult and statistically significant differences 
between the two procedural options were not found in any of the relevant metrics, it was clear from observations 
during the scenarios and interviews after the simulation that strong preferences do exist.  In particular, two common 
themes were observed consistently during the experiment: controllers universally reported preferring that pilots of IFR 
aircraft first obtain an amended clearance before executing any self-separation maneuver regardless of the magnitude 
of that maneuver; and secondly, only when an encounter is imminent (i.e. with a time to CPA under about a minute) 
and the controller has failed to issue a traffic advisory is it relatively acceptable for pilots to indicate that they are 
maneuvering immediately. A representative piece of written feedback from one controller was  
 
"Real-world IFR pilots should not & almost never will turn without a clearance. [It is] almost emergency status 
to enact such a maneuver... I would have read the pilot the riot act & possibly written him up..."  
  
The clear message from the controllers is that if there is any time available to request an amended clearance, then one 
should be requested.   
Although the notion that IFR pilots should coordinate with ATC before executing self-separation maneuvers is 
well understood and by far the most common procedure, experienced pilots report that deviations from a clearance 
are sometimes necessary, whether due to high controller workload, inability to make a request on a heavily used voice 
frequency, or the imminence of a problem requiring a deviation.3  Perhaps even more surprising is that despite 
controllers' strong preference for pilots to coordinate maneuvers, their desire to accommodate pilot preferences and 
adapt to any unforeseen airspace circumstances meant that they rarely objected directly to pilot deviations or ordered 
pilots to immediately return to the original clearance.  This desire manifested itself in no measurable or significant 
differences in self-reported workload, ability to provide additional services or detection of airspace or pilot anomalies 
between the two procedural conditions. When a numerical value between 1 and 5 is assigned to each of the possible 
answers to questions in the post-run and post-simulation surveys (see the questionnaires in Appendices B and C and 
the individual responses in Appendix L) the workload and impact on additional services are not statistically different 
between the two procedural conditions: mean self-reported workload for procedures A and B (Appendix B question 5 
and Figure L1) were 3.50 and 3.52, respectively (p=0.91), and mean impact on ability to provide additional services 
                                               
 
 
 
3 See title 14 of the code of federal regulations part 91 sections 123 and 181. 
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B (Appendix B question 6 and Figure L2) was 3.00 and 2.90 (p=0.99).  Airspace and pilot anomalies were actually 
more likely to be noticed in the request procedure A (52%, 14 yes responses out of 27 total responses) than the 
execute/notify procedure B (39%, 11 yes responses out of 28 total responses), though post-simulation review shows 
these anomalies were not related to pilot deviations from clearances (see Appendix B question 7 and Figure L3). The 
difference in the response rate between the two conditions is not statistically significant (p=0.36). The take away from 
this finding is that controllers are quite resilient to failures to follow established procedures, but this resilience does 
not imply that such failures should become precedents. 
The self-reported workload and degree of objectionable behavior between the procedural conditions were not 
significantly different when controllers were asked about these metrics after each scenario, principally because other 
factors like providing separation services or miles-in-trail restrictions were observed to overwhelm any such effect, if 
it existed. However, 29% of controllers did report that pilot deviations from a clearance created an adverse situation 
at some point in the experiment (see Appendix C question 6 and Figure L4).   So although the study was unable to 
objectively measure a safety impact from those particular pilot actions—a metric that is often fraught with difficulty 
because of the many overlapping safety procedures and technologies in place to avoid a safety impact on the 
airspace—there was clearly a degree of concern about such operations reported by the controller participants. 
A question that arises regularly in the area of UAS-NAS integration is whether airspace stakeholders will consider 
UAS to be any different from manned aircraft once they have the technologies and procedures in place to meet all the 
airspace integration requirements.  While the goal of many research programs is to make UAS functionally identical 
to manned aircraft, the question has lingered as to whether air traffic controllers would treat them differently knowing 
a pilot was not on board.  When controllers were asked whether UAS maneuver requests were more or less acceptable 
than manned aircraft requests they reported most often that deviations by UAS are similarly acceptable to those of 
manned aircraft (see Appendix C question 9 and Figure L5). Those responses suggest that controllers do not 
differentiate between the two aircraft types.  In fact, the UAS requests were more likely to be rated as more acceptable 
than manned aircraft requests because some controllers believed the superior-range sensors available to the UAS 
would provide better information to those pilots than visual acquisition alone would for manned pilots.  Other feedback 
suggested that UAS would be treated differently from manned aircraft if they operated in ways that led controllers to 
distrust their behavior or capabilities, for example by turning and changing altitude without warning when a 
communication link is lost. However, this differentiation would be based on observed behaviors and leads to the same 
differential treatment that low-time general aviation pilots receive as compared to commercial pilots.  No significant 
bias towards or against UAS operations was measured in this simulation. 
B. Subjective Acceptability of Alert Thresholds 
There were two primary goals in examining the acceptability to controllers of different request/maneuver 
thresholds: (1) to determine how far ahead of an encounter a pilot should maneuver or request a maneuver; and (2) to 
understand whether any of the thresholds would increase controller workload or reduce their ability to provide 
additional services because they were busy responding to pilot requests.  The experiment setup relied only on post-
scenario and post-simulation questionnaires to determine workload and controller impact in order to avoid introducing 
distractions.  
At the end of each scenario controllers were asked to rate their overall workload, whether the workload impacted 
their ability to provide additional services (i.e. issuance of traffic advisories) and whether they noticed any pilot 
behavior or simulation artifacts that did not conform to their expectations for behavior in the real world. The 
differences in the numbers of responses for each alert threshold, shown in Appendix L in Figures L6, L7 and L8, are 
not statistically significant, indicating either that the threshold differences did not affect the metrics or that other 
airspace factors contributed so much to these metrics that differences between the thresholds were not measurable. 
Debriefings with the controllers indicated that the largest threshold was objectionable, and that at 120 seconds to 
CPA aircraft were often too far away for pilots to be concerned enough about an intruder to be requesting a maneuver.  
It was judged too early to maneuver at that point without coordinating first with the controller. Representative feedback 
from one controller illustrated the difference between typical behavior of pilots of manned aircraft and that of a UAS 
with a 120-sec request/maneuver threshold, even if the maneuver is coordinated with the controller: 
 
 "My experience was pilots rarely spotted traffic very early & almost never asked for turns around 
the traffic. They usually spot the traffic and just separate themselves with altitude or laterally. If the 
UAS detects traffic I would think they would trust their equipment re: altitude or heading -OR- they 
would ask ATC about the traffic, then respond appropriately." 
 
In addition to indicating that the 120-sec threshold is too large, this quote and similar feedback from other 
controllers suggests that the separation standard being used for UAS (approximately 0.8 nmi laterally and 400 ft 
vertically) is larger than what pilots find acceptable when performing visual see and avoid. It also implies that, contrary 
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to the feedback from the preceding section, pilots do execute small maneuvers for separation with the implicit consent 
of the controller.  These findings are difficult to confirm in simulation alone, however, so a nominal set of procedures 
and separation standard should be established and real-world performance of the pilot-DAA system monitored to 
ensure any necessary revisions are implemented. 
In contrast to the 120-sec threshold, controllers expressed far fewer objections to the distance at which pilots were 
requesting or executing maneuvers in the 60- and 90-sec conditions.  When an encounter progressed down to the lower 
threshold of 60 sec without a traffic advisory and pilots requested a maneuver, the controllers frequently reported that 
they had not observed the developing close encounter and nearly always approved the requested maneuver.  This 
finding suggests that proactive pilot maneuvering when the controller is too busy to issue traffic advisories could 
increase safety. The 90-sec threshold was also generally acceptable unless the encounter geometry resulted in an 
aircraft-to-aircraft range of more than about 10 nmi. This situation was reported as unrealistic by controllers because 
pilots of manned aircraft rarely detect intruders at such distances and almost never are able to decide they are enough 
of a threat to request an evasive maneuver.  It appears that both the time to CPA and the horizontal distance are 
necessary to determine whether a maneuver will be compatible with controller expectations. 
C. Objective Data on Traffic Advisories 
The difficulty of measuring subjective differences in controllers' perceptions of the procedural options and 
request/maneuver thresholds drove the need to examine objective data to address these research issues.  Rather than 
relying on the controllers' objections to specific maneuver requests that were too early, we measured the times and 
relative geometries at which controllers issued traffic advisories. It was expected that pilot action to coordinate and 
execute a maneuver to avoid an intruder would be acceptable after a traffic advisory is issued, an expectation 
confirmed during observations of the simulation and feedback from controllers during the debriefing sessions.  Note, 
however, that the pilot action times reported here are dependent not only on the controllers' decisions to issue traffic 
advisories, but also the scripted times at which the confederate pilots were instructed to request or execute maneuvers.  
Even the metrics related to times and distances at which the controllers issued traffic advisories are influenced to an 
extent by the fact that pilots would take action at a scripted point, precluding an advisory from being issued after that 
point.  The net effect of this interaction is that the mean traffic advisory times and distances are somewhat larger than 
would be expected if the pilots had never taken any action, though the relative consistency of the metrics across 
request/maneuver threshold conditions suggests that the actual values are within about 10 sec or 0.5 nmi of the values 
reported here.  
The mean times to CPA at which pilots maneuvered, requested a maneuver or received a traffic advisory as a 
function of the request/maneuver threshold condition is shown in Figure 4. The figure shows that, when an advisory 
is not received, the pilots tend to request/maneuver at the appropriate times, albeit about 10 sec late 90-sec condition 
and 20 sec late in the 120-sec condition.  In contrast, the mean times at which advisories are issued are much more 
consistent, varying between 114 and 130 sec.  The variation is largely due to differences between controllers' 
preferences in issuing advisories (shown in Appendix A), but is sufficiently consistent to allow plotting of the entire 
set of advisories as a cumulative distribution with which to fit a probabilistic model of the time to CPA and ranges at 
which controllers issue advisories.  This analysis is presented in the following section. These values are consistent 
with the subjective feedback from the controllers that pilots should not request maneuvers to avoid intruders until they 
are less than 110 sec from CPA, since this would preempt the controller's natural procedure to advise the pilot of a 
potential problem and only later negotiate whether and what to do about it.  The value of 110 sec should be considered 
an upper limit, not a preferred threshold time. (The ATC-preferred time is likely much lower.) 
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Figure 4.  Mean times to CPA between aircraft at the point a traffic advisory (TA) was issued or pilots took action (when 
no TA had been received by the scripted threshold). 
The horizontal distance between aircraft at which pilots maneuvered, requested a maneuver or received a traffic 
advisory as a function of the request/maneuver threshold condition is shown in Figure 5.  The overall trends are similar 
to the time-to-CPA chart shown previously: the distances are dependent on the alert thresholds when pilots 
requested/maneuvered when no TA was received, but were independent of alert threshold when advisories were 
issued.  The consistency of values around 8-9 nmi supports controllers' feedback that they are unlikely to issue an 
advisory if they do not think that a pilot will be able to see an intruder aircraft. The fact that these values are not 
significantly affected by the pilots' different request/maneuver thresholds indicates that the true distance at which they 
would typically issue the advisories is close to these values.  Further, the data suggest that, in order to be consistent 
with controller expectations and manned aircraft behavior, UAS pilots should not request a maneuver to avoid an 
intruder until that intruder is less than 8 nmi away. This value of 8 nmi should be considered an upper limit, not a 
preferred threshold distance. (The ATC-preferred distance is likely much closer.) 
Figure 5. Mean horizontal distance between aircraft at the point a traffic advisory was issued or pilots took action (when 
no TA had been received by the scripted threshold). 
The vertical separation between aircraft at which advisories were issued is not shown here because of the strong 
interplay between the horizontal and vertical dimensions and because the vertical separation was not systematically 
varied across the encounters in a way that would allow cross-condition comparisons.  The horizontal distance at which 
the advisory was issued can be plotted because controllers will only issue advisories when the vertical distance will 
be small at CPA. Thus, the horizontal distance and not the vertical separation is the main factor driving the advisory 
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decision. However, future analysis should examine the horizontal and vertical distances at CPA that must be satisfied 
in order for a controller to decide that an advisory is warranted. 
A plot of the horizontal distance versus time to CPA at which each advisory was issued over the whole simulation 
is shown in Figure 14.  Two aspects of that chart are notable: a diagonal limit that follows a line from the origin to the 
upper right indicates a maximum closure velocity of approximately 450 kts, a limit that will depend on the fastest 
expected intruder and the ownship velocity; secondly, except for a few encounters that controllers did not detect until 
the aircraft were already at CPA, advisories are always issued when aircraft are at least 1.65 nmi apart.  This latter 
point is particularly relevant because it determines the distance at which an advisory would be issued for a slowly 
evolving encounter (e.g. an overtake). 
 
The encounter geometries at which traffic advisories were issued by the controllers is a key predictor of the point 
at which pilots may be expected to begin requesting maneuvers to remain well clear of intruder aircraft. Plots of the 
time to CPA and the horizontal distance as a function of relative heading at which the advisories were issued are 
shown in Figure 7.  The contours of the distances and times at which these were issued, grouped into bins 30 degrees 
wide, are also plotted to help indicate the trend with relative heading.  Note that 0 degree relative heading means the 
two aircraft were traveling in the same direction, while 180 degrees indicates a head-on encounter. These charts help 
indicate how heading, range and time to CPA for a particular encounter translate into the likelihood that a traffic 
advisory will be issued. 
The data from Figure 7 is replotted in Figure 8 to more clearly show the trend of the horizontal range and time to 
CPA as a function of relative heading at which traffic advisories were issued.  It is expected that head-on encounters, 
because of their relatively high closure rate in comparison with other encounter angles, would be alerted at larger 
ranges and shorter times to CPA, while those encounters in which the aircraft are traveling in roughly the same 
direction and therefore have relatively more similar speeds would be alerted at shorter ranges and with longer times 
to CPA.  Figure 8 largely supports this expectation, though because of a limited number of data points in some relative 
heading angle bins this trend is not monotonic: encounters near 120 degrees interrupt the overall trend.  However, the 
data do support the notion that controllers use the same basic alerting criteria designed for self separation and collision 
avoidance systems that combines a temporal criterion with a geometric one to safely incorporate high and low range-
rate encounters without an excessive number of false alerts. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
20
0 50 100 150 200 250 300
H
o
ri
zo
n
ta
l D
is
ta
n
ce
 (
n
m
i)
Time to CPA (sec)
Figure 6. Horizontal distance and time to CPA at which each traffic advisory in the experiment was issued. 
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Figure 7. Contours of horizontal distance and time to CPA at which controllers issued TAs as a function of relative heading. 
Outer rings are at 20 nmi and 250 seconds, respectively.  Headings are measured in a range of 0 to 180 degrees, but the 
contours are drawn symmetrically up to 360 degrees for clarity. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8. Relative heading vs horizontal range (left) and time to CPA (right) for each traffic advisory issued.  Contours are 
identical to those shown in Figure 7.  
D. Distributions of Traffic Advisories by Range and Time to CPA 
This section presents empirically fitted models of the ranges and times to CPA at which controllers issued traffic 
advisories.  It does not try to predict when an advisory will be issued, examine all the potential metrics controllers 
might use to decide whether and when to issue an advisory, nor investigate the interplay between different metrics' 
contributions to the probability that an advisory will be issued.  The value of this analysis is its quantification of 
objective temporal and geometric metrics against the behavior of controllers, which is the first step towards completing 
the additional analyses listed above.  Until those analyses are completed and a traffic advisory model has been 
produced, this data should be used to ensure pilots do not request resolution maneuvers when controllers would not 
normally consider a given encounter to yet warrant action. 
The time to CPA and the relative range between aircraft at which traffic advisories were issued are shown in Table 
3.  That table shows that the median time to CPA at which an advisory is issued is 109 sec and the range is 8.29 nmi; 
these values are consistent with controllers’ feedback in post-simulation interviews and questionnaires that they are 
unlikely to issue an advisory if they do not believe the pilot is likely to see the intruder and suggested that would occur 
around about 8 nmi.  The table also indicates that only 25% of advisories are issued when the time to CPA is less than 
83.5 sec or range is less than 5.86 nmi; in other words 75% of all advisories were issued with larger times or distances.  
This may be roughly interpreted by a pilot observing an intruder at this temporal or geometric threshold as evidence 
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that the controller may have been too busy or distracted to notice this encounter because in 75% of similar encounters 
an advisory would already have been issued.  In such circumstances the pilot should be confident that coordinating a 
maneuver with the controller will not be a nuisance and may increase safety.  
Only 10% of advisories were issued with a time to CPA below 62 seconds and a range under 3.8 nmi. At this point 
the overwhelming majority of TAs would already have been issued and therefore may constitute evidence that the 
controller is so busy that a TA is unlikely to be issued and the immediacy of the encounter requires action before 
coordination may take place.  It should be emphasized that pilots should not wait until this 60-sec threshold and then 
take uncoordinated action; rather if an encounter with an intruder is first alerted near this threshold, then uncoordinated 
action is likely necessary. These proposed 60- and 80-sec thresholds are consistent with the intruder-alerting logic 
recently tested in piloted simulations.xi The thresholds received positive subjective feedback, indicating they are likely 
to satisfy both pilots and air traffic controllers when used for DAA systems on UAS. 
 
Table 3. Empirical values of the proportion of TAs issued at given metrics or below. 
 
 
The data used to generate Table 3 is plotted as a set of contours in Figure 9 to show the relationship between the 
temporal and geometric factors.  The figure indicates the proportion of traffic advisories that were issued with greater 
temporal and geometric encounter characteristics than the given point in the space of these metrics. A three-
dimensional representation of the probabilities that the contours represent is shown in Figure 10. While the contours 
are flat (horizontal or vertical) where they intersect the axes, indicating that only one of the two metrics is an important 
predictor of the probability of a traffic advisory in these conditions, the curved nature of the contours between these 
extremes shows that both metrics do contribute to the advisory probability.   
To illustrate the use of these plots, if the current horizontal distance between aircraft is about 8 nmi and the time 
to CPA is less than 75 seconds, then the probability of an advisory is 50%.  However, if the time to CPA is 100 sec 
the probability is 40%, dropping to 20% at 130 sec and being nearly zero for any time greater than 180 sec.  Such a 
contour plot could be used to indicate the probability that an advisory would normally have been issued at this point 
in a given encounter, with a particular level of probability (e.g. 75%) being selected as the point at which a pilot should 
begin discussing potential maneuvers with the controller if they have not already received a traffic advisory.  This 
does not imply that the DAA system should avoid alerting a pilot until this point; instead the alert should have come 
at least 20 seconds earlier to allow the pilot time to obtain situation awareness about the intruder, determine an 
appropriate course of action and prepare to input the maneuver into the flight control system.  If a traffic advisory is 
received before the threshold probability is reached then the pilot will be ready to respond appropriately, and if one is 
not received by the threshold the pilot will be ready to request a well-considered resolution maneuver. 
 
Figure 9. Contours of the proportion of traffic advisories issued given the distance and time criteria were greater than or 
equal to the metrics on each axis. 
Percentage of 
Data 
Time to CPA 
(sec) 
Range between 
Aircraft (nmi) 
10% 61.7 3.82 
25% 83.5 5.86 
50% 109.0 8.29 
75% 153.5 10.80 
90% 215.6 13.52 
 14 
 
 
 
Figure 10.  Three-dimensional representation of the empirical data on the probability a traffic advisory is issued as a 
function of horizontal distance and time to CPA. 
The threshold at which a pilot should begin coordinating with a controller about a potential maneuver cannot be 
directly selected from the data gathered in this study, but future studies could examine an appropriate threshold using 
the empirical data collected here.  For that purpose several different distributions were fit to the empirical data, with 
the best two among a wide range of distribution reported in Table 4.  That table also reports the parameters of a best-
fit Normal distribution for reference purposes, not because it is a particularly good representation of the data.  
  
Table 4. Maximum likelihood estimates of the best parameter fits for two traffic advisory metrics. 
Distribution 
Type 
Time to CPA (sec) Distance to CPA (nmi) 
 Parameters Log-
Likelihood 
Max 
Error 
Parameters Log-Likelihood Max 
Error 
Generalized 
extreme value 
k=0.0239, 
σ=50.16, 
μ=95.59 
-1145.0 7.28% 
k=-0.0060, 
σ=3.29, μ=6.84 -573.9 6.18% 
Gamma a=3.49, b=35.98 -1149.2 7.31% a=4.38, b=1.99 -574.8 6.17% 
Normal μ=125.7, σ=67.5 -1170.8 13.6% μ=8.70, σ=4.23 -594.4 9.21% 
 
The best fit of the tested distributions was the generalized extreme value (GEV) distribution, which is normally 
used to model the value of the largest (most extreme) member of each of a set of samples drawn from the same 
distribution. The log-likelihood of each fit, which is the probability that the empirical data set was generated from the 
given distribution, was higher for the GEV distribution than any other for both the time and distance metrics. The 
maximum error in the fitted cumulative distribution function (CDF) from the empirical CDF also compared favorably 
with other distributions, though it was not always the best in this respect.  The maximum error is defined as the 
maximum difference between the probability of a traffic advisory being issued at a given threshold as estimated by 
the distribution and the actual observed frequency with which advisories had been issued.  For example, a maximum 
error of 7.28% could mean that if the predicted number of advisories issued with a time to CPA under 125 sec is 60% 
the actual observed number is 67.28%   The best fit parameters for this distribution are given in Table 4, and the 
probability distribution function (PDF) is given by, 
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Although the GEV distribution was the best fit overall of the empirical data, its theoretical basis does not appear 
to match the processes at work in a controller's decision to issue a traffic advisory, and its success may be due to 
chance given the large number of distributions tested.  A function that has been used to model human response times 
in this domainxii is the gamma distribution: its log-likelihood is nearly as good as the GEV distribution and its 
maximum error is slightly lower for the range metric.  The simpler form of the distribution and its prior use in this 
domain may make it a more attractive candidate to model the probability a controller will issue a traffic advisory at a 
given temporal or geometric threshold.  The PDF of the gamma distribution is 
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To help visualize the performance of the three distributions whose parameters are reported in Table 4, each fit is 
plotted against the empirical data as either a PDF (Figure 11) or CDF (Figure 12).  These charts illustrate the closeness 
of the GEV and gamma distributions, along with the relative inaccuracy of the normal distribution.  Future work 
should explore multivariate distributions that can fit both the temporal and geometric variables into a single probability 
distribution, along with more sophisticated models that incorporate additional metrics in an attempt to predict when 
an advisory will be issued for a specific encounter.  
 
 
  
Figure 11.  PDF of the empirical data on range (left) or time to CPA (right) at which controllers issued traffic advisories. 
Best fits for three distributions are overlaid on the empirical data. 
 
IV. Conclusions 
 A human-in-the-loop experiment was conducted with 15 retired air traffic controllers to investigate the 
appropriateness of procedures for the use of DAA systems and the maximum temporal and geometric thresholds at 
which pilots should request a maneuver to remain well clear.  Each controller managed aircraft in four different 
scenarios with mixed IFR and VFR traffic. Controllers provided separation services, miles-in-trail restrictions and 
additional services, workload permitting. Of particular interest in this study was the issuance of traffic advisories, 
which are used to notify pilots that evasive action may be necessary to avoid intruder aircraft.  Two procedural options 
were tested in the pilots' use of the DAA system within each scenario, and three different request/maneuver thresholds 
were tested in a between-subjects comparison. Controller participants filled out post-scenario and post-simulation 
questionnaires on workload and realism of pilot behaviors, and pointed out to observers during the simulation any 
"objectionable" pilot maneuvers.  Metrics were collected on the rate of objectionable behaviors as a function of the 
independent variables and the relative states of aircraft when controllers issued traffic advisories. 
 
 16 
  
 
 
 
 
Figure 12. CDFs of the empirical data on range (top) or time to CPA (bottom) at which controllers issued traffic 
advisories (TA). Best fits for three distributions are overlaid on the empirical data. 
The subjective feedback from the controller participants indicated a strong preference for pilots to request 
maneuvers to remain well clear from intruder aircraft rather than deviate proactively from their IFR clearance and 
notify the controller afterwards. However, many controllers indicated that under certain circumstances it might be 
necessary for pilots to take action before consulting with a controller.  Controllers also indicated that a maneuver 
threshold of 120 seconds until CPA frequently led to pilot requests that were unnecessary and deviations that were too 
large.  When the procedural condition required pilots to only notify the controller after they had maneuvered, 
controllers reported those actions could lead to unsafe situations.  In contrast, when the maneuver threshold was set to 
60 or 90 seconds, the pilots' requests were more consistent with controller expectations.  However, although controllers 
believed the timing of the requests was appropriate, the magnitudes of requested maneuvers were frequently judged 
as too large.  Because these maneuvers were sized to avoid the quantitative UAS well clear definition, this feedback 
may indicate that the UAS well clear standard is larger than the one employed by pilots of manned aircraft. This 
inconsistency could differentiate UAS from manned aircraft in terms of their effect on the airspace. 
 Controllers issued traffic advisories (TAs) to aircraft pairs that, in their judgment, could evolve into a violation of 
the applicable separation standard.  Under current operations, controllers expect pilots may then request a maneuver 
to ensure they do not violate the standard, which in the case of UAS is the quantitative well-clear definition.  The point 
at which controllers issue these traffic advisories may be used as an upper limit to the time or distance from a close 
encounter at which the pilot should request a maneuver.  The relative states of aircraft were recorded at the points 
controllers issued traffic advisories in the simulation, with the minimum separation for a “routine” TA of 1.65 nmi (a 
non-routine TA would be one the controller would have issued earlier had they noticed the encounter earlier). The 
time to CPA and relative range metrics, which are used to predict encounters in other separation algorithms, were then 
fit against a series of distributions, and it was found that the generalized extreme value and gamma distributions are 
good matches to the empirical data.   
We propose that pilots wait to request a maneuver until after controllers would usually have issued an advisory in 
similar encounter conditions, potentially using a threshold of 75% probability that an advisory would have been issued.  
This threshold would mean that pilots should wait until CPA is approximately 80 seconds away or the intruder is 
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within about 6 nmi to request a maneuver, using the prior 20-30 seconds to begin preparing an appropriate maneuver. 
Controllers will normally have issued 90% of advisories before an encounter progresses to 60 seconds and 4 nmi, 
which corresponds to a very short alert time. If the controller has not issued a TA prior to this point, data and subjective 
feedback from this simulation indicates they are likely too busy to provide the additional TA service. Controllers 
indicated that proactive maneuvering by the UAS to remain well clear under these circumstances should increase 
safety. Implementation of these criteria in the procedural use of DAA systems and alerting logic should lead to pilot 
requests that are compatible with controller expectations and preserve the typical pilot-controller interaction process, 
leading to more seamless UAS operations in the domestic U.S air transportation system. 
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VII. Appendicies  
A. Traffic Advisory Metrics by Controller Participant 
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B. Post-Run Controller Questionnaire 
Date: ______________        First Scenario 
1.  The flow of traffic in my sector was representative of a low altitude en route sector.  (Check one 
line below)  
__  Yes 
__  No 
__  Uncertain 
Comments:  
____________________________________________________________________ 
2. The traffic density in my sector was realistic relative to current-day operations (check one box 
below) 
     
Much less busy 
than normal  
Somewhat less 
busy than 
normal 
Typical 
Somewhat 
busier than 
normal 
Much busier 
than normal 
 
Comments:  
____________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. As compared with normal real-world operations, the number of the encounters in this trial was: 
     
Much less 
frequent  
Somewhat less 
frequent 
Typical 
Somewhat more 
frequent 
Much more 
frequent 
 
Comments:  
____________________________________________________________________ 
4. As compared with normal real-world operations, the complexity of the encounters in this trial 
was: 
     
Much easier to 
detect and resolve 
Somewhat 
easier to detect 
and resolve 
Neither easier 
nor more 
difficult to 
detect and 
resolve 
Somewhat more 
difficult to 
detect and 
resolve 
Much more 
difficult to 
detect and 
resolve 
 
Comments:  
____________________________________________________________________ 
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5. As compared with normal real-world operations, how would you rate your workload during this 
scenario? 
     
Much lower than 
normal  
Somewhat lower 
than normal 
Typical 
Somewhat 
higher than 
normal 
Much higher 
than normal 
 
Comments:  
____________________________________________________________________ 
6. Did the workload and complexity of the scenario impact your ability to provide additional 
services (direct routings, traffic advisories, etc.)? 
     
Zero impact on 
additional services 
A small impact 
on additional 
services 
Could provide a 
typical degree of 
additional 
services 
Large impact on 
additional 
services 
Unable to 
provide 
additional 
services 
 
Comments:  
____________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. Did you notice any ghost controller, aircraft, pilot, or software behavior in the simulation that 
did not conform to your expectations or that was unlike behavior in the real world?   
__  Yes 
__  No 
__  Uncertain 
If yes, please list all such examples: 
_________________________________________________ 
 
Did such behavior reduce your situational awareness, increase your workload, or have any 
other detrimental impacts on your performance? 
__________________________________________ 
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C. Post-Simulation Controller Questionnaire 
Date: ______________       
1. As compared with air traffic control displays used operationally, the ATC display 
environment used during the simulation: 
     
Had major display 
issues that 
prevented me 
from performing 
routine tasks 
Had minor 
display issues 
that detracted 
from my ability 
to control traffic 
Was adequate 
for controlling 
air traffic 
Was a good 
emulation of a 
controller 
workstation, 
with only minor 
differences 
Was a realistic 
emulation of a 
controller 
workstation 
 
Comments:  
____________________________________________________________________ 
2. Did any pilots request deviations due to traffic? 
__  Yes 
__  No 
__  Uncertain 
If yes, were any requests inappropriate?  
____________________________________________ 
 
3. Did any pilots deviate for traffic without requesting an amended clearance? 
__  Yes 
__  No 
__  Uncertain 
 
o Were any deviations (without amended clearances) unacceptable or inappropriate? 
 
Comments:  ___________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. Did the pilots deviate for traffic in a way similar to pilots in the real world? 
     
Very similar to 
pilots in the real 
world  
Similar to pilots 
in the real world 
Not similar or 
different to 
pilots in the real 
world 
Different than 
pilots in the real 
world 
Very different 
from pilots in 
the real world 
 
Comments:  ___________________________________________________________________ 
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5. Do you feel you noticed all pilot deviations? 
__  Yes 
__  No 
__  Uncertain 
 
Comments:  ___________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. Did any deviations (without an amended clearance) create an adverse situation, for example a conflict 
with a third aircraft? 
__  Yes 
__  No 
__  Uncertain 
Comments:  ___________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. How would you have preferred the pilot conduct the deviation, particularly with respect to prior 
coordination with you? 
 
Comments:  ___________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. What circumstances contributed to whether a deviation was acceptable? 
 
Comments:  ___________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. Were deviations requested or made by unmanned aircraft more or less acceptable to you than those 
made by pilots of manned aircraft? 
     
UAS deviations 
much less 
acceptable  
UAS deviations 
less acceptable 
UAS deviations 
same 
acceptability 
UAS deviations 
more acceptable 
UAS deviations 
much more 
acceptable 
 
Comments:  ___________________________________________________________________ 
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10. Discuss the procedural alternatives presented in this simulation with the researcher, then answer the 
following questions:  
o Did you notice a difference in the procedures from encounter to encounter? 
__  Yes 
__  No 
__  Uncertain 
 
Comments:  ___________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
o Which procedure version did you prefer?  Under what circumstances would each version be 
appropriate?   
 
Comments:  ___________________________________________________________________ 
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D. Air Traffic Controller Demographics Questionnaire 
Please fill in the blanks or circle your response to each question below 
1a.  What types of facilities have you worked in? (Circle all that apply):  
 
FAA ATCT  Military ATCT  FAA TRACON 
Military RAPCON  ARTCC 
 
1b. How many years at each?   
 FAA ATCT   __________________ 
 Military ATCT   __________________ 
 FAA TRACON   __________________ 
 Military RAPCON  __________________ 
 ARTCC    __________________  
 
1c. If applicable, did you achieve Full Performance Level (FPL) at: (Circle all that apply) 
 
 FAA ATCT   YES     NO     N/A 
 Military ATCT   YES     NO     N/A 
 FAA TRACON   YES     NO     N/A 
 Military RAPCON  YES     NO     N/A 
 ARTCC    YES     NO     N/A  
 
1d. Briefly describe your experience at each facility (e.g., location, duration, responsibilities): 
____________________________________________________________________________
_________________ 
2. Briefly describe any other experience you might have in air traffic management, such as 
Flight Services, Supervision, Training, or TMA (e.g., location, duration, responsibilities): 
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3a. Have you ever worked within ZOA airspace? 
 YES     NO 
 
3b. If yes, how many years of experience do you have with ZOA airspace?  
____________________________________________________________________________
________________ 
4a. Do you have any experience working with unmanned aircraft systems (UAS)? 
 YES     NO 
 
4b. If yes, please rate your level of experience working with UAS:  
1 
No 
Experience 
2 3 
Somewhat 
Experienced 
4 5 
 
Experienced 
6 7 
Very 
Experienced 
 
4c. What type/model of UAS do you have experience working with? 
 
____________________________________________________________________________
_______________ 
 
5a. Do you have any experience serving as a participant in simulation research? 
 YES     NO 
 
5b. If yes, how many years of experience do you have as a simulation participant?   
 
____________________________________________________________________________
_______________ 
 
6a. Do you have any experience participating in simulation research involving UAS? 
 YES     NO 
 
6b. If so, how many years of experience do you have with UAS simulation research?   
 
____________________________________________________________________________
________________ 
 
7a. Do you have any experience with ERAM? 
 YES     NO 
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7b. If yes, could you describe your experience briefly?  
____________________________________________________________________________
________________ 
8a. Do you have normal or corrected to normal visual acuity? 
 YES     NO 
8b. Do you have normal color vision? 
 YES     NO 
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E. Experiment Briefing to Air Traffic Control Participants 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Air Traffic Controller Briefing
“Integrated” Human in the Loop Simulation
6/9/14
Eric Mueller
Doug Isaacson
Seung Man Lee
Chester Gong
Confesor Santiago
 
1 
Simulation Background
• UAS integration in the national airspace system (NAS) project
– Developing the requirements for UAS to safely integrate with existing 
air traffic in the next several years
– Principle objective is for UAS to behave just like manned aircraft from 
an ATC perspective
• Past simulations have investigated requirements for pilot 
interaction with the UAS systems, including response times
• Future simulations and flight tests will demonstrate the safety 
of the overall concept and technologies for UAS-NAS 
integration
• This simulation is the first of the “integrated” simulation 
studies and will provide a baseline for later safety 
demonstrations
2 
Overall Objectives
• Evaluate the fidelity of the air traffic simulation 
environment for future simulations and flight tests
• Collect data that improves modeling of controller 
performance in batch simulations
3 
Instructions
• To help us improve simulation fidelity, please 
point out any simulation or scenario 
inconsistencies, problems, concerns, bugs, etc. 
during the run.  
– The observer will note these and follow up with 
any additional details you wish to provide at the 
end of the run.
– The pseudo-pilot adherence to real operations is 
important, please point out any time they don’t 
conform to your expectations or it raises your 
workload/increases complexity.
4 
Data Collection
• Written surveys distributed after each 
scenario and at the end of the day
– Simulations inconsistencies, bugs, un-realistic 
situations, etc.
– Evaluation of controller interface
– Comparison of traffic densities, complexity 
workload, flow characteristics with the real world
– Whether simulation inconsistencies affected your 
performance
 
5 
Daily Schedule
Time Task Duration
830 Introduction / Controller Briefing 20
850 MACS Training 30
920 MACS Practice 80
1040 Break 10
1050 First Scenario 40
1130 Post Trial Forms 10
1140 Lunch 60
1240 Second Scenario 40
1320 Post Trial Forms 10
1330 Break 10
1340 Third Scenario 40
1420 Post Trial Forms 10
1430 Break 10
1440 Fourth Scenario 40
1520 Post Trial Forms 10
1530 Debrief 60
1630 End
6 
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F. Experiment Debrief to Air Traffic Control Participants 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Air Traffic Controller Debrief
“Integrated” Human in the Loop Simulation
6/9/14
Eric Mueller
Doug Isaacson
Seung Man Lee
Chester Gong
Confesor Santiago
 
1 
Background
• Federal aviation regulations (FARs) related to responsibility for aircraft-to-
aircraft separation are contradictory under common interpretations
– 91.111: Pilot may not operate in a way that creates a collision hazard 
– 91.113: Pilot must remain well clear of other aircraft
– 91.123: Pilot may not deviate from an ATC clearance except in an emergency
– 91.181: Allows pilot to “maneuver the aircraft to pass well clear of other air 
traffic”
• Application of FARs is based on historical, legal interpretation
– Traditional pilots and ATC have established a generally complementary division 
of separation responsibility
– Several factors suggest this division of separation responsibility may not apply 
to UAS
• Longer range detection of intruder aircraft (e.g. airborne radar)
• Better algorithms to determine separation maneuvers at long ranges
• Unknown performance of self-separation function when using a 2D display rather than out-the-
window view
 
2 
Specific Objectives
• Evaluate the acceptability to the controller of maneuvers performed for 
“self separation”
– Compare procedures in which SS maneuvers are or are not coordinated with 
ATC before execution 
– Measure the deviation magnitude the controllers (1) detect and (2) object to
– Provide data to support DAA use conops for SC-228 Ops sub-group
• Collect data that improves batch simulations
– Time required for controllers to approve or disapprove self separation 
maneuvers
– Use controller-approved maneuvers to improve self-separation algorithm 
recommendations
– Time and distance thresholds at which traffic advisories are issued, and 
airspace/scenario characteristics that suppress these advisories
 
3 
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G. LVC-DE Detailed System Architecturexi 
DFRC LVC LAB
LVC
Gateway
Gateway Data 
Logger/Recorder
SAA Proc
AutoResolver/
CA
Functional Architecture Test Setup 1
ADRS Toolbox
MACS 
Sim Manager
Traffic 
Generator
ADRS
HLA - High Level Architecture
ARC CVSRF – Pilot Lab
DFRC RGCS LAB
LVC GW Toolbox
ARC DSRL
ARC CVSRF – ATC Lab
MACS Pseudo Pilot 
MACS Pseudo Pilot Ghost Controller
Ghost Pilot
Controller Station 
Pilot CmdsPilot Control 
Station
Vigilant Spirit 
Control Station
(VSCS SIM)
VSCS Traffic 
Display
IT&E Components
LVC Participants  & Displays 
RUMS 
Server
Internet
RUMS 
Internet
Browser
RUMS
Internet
Browser
CSD 
Observer
MACS 
Observer
MACS 
Observer
ADRS
RUMS 
Internet
Browser
Observer StationsMACS Observer
CSD 
Observer
MACS Observer
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H. Detect-and-avoid Procedures for Pilots as an Experiment Variable 
 
Operational Concept
• Self-separation from VFR aircraft is the responsibility of all 
pilots, even those receiving ATC separation services
• Procedural options for use of self-separation (SS) system: pilot 
responsibility
– Request an amended clearance (option A)
– Notification at the time of deviation from clearance (option B)
• Traffic advisories (TAs) are issued between all aircraft talking 
to ATC as an “additional service, workload permitting”
– Before a TA is provided to an IFR aircraft, either procedural option is 
reasonable
– After a TA is provided, only a request for amended clearance is 
reasonable (option A)
 
Candidate SS Procedures
(final)
Option Description Discussion Reference 
Regulations/Guidance
A Amended
Clearance 
(preferred)
Time permitting, pilot is required to request an amended 
clearance when a Self Separation maneuver would cause 
a deviation
14 CFR 91.123a, AIM 4-4-
1a, AIM 4-4-1b
B ATC 
Notification 
ASAP following 
initiation of 
Self Separation 
Maneuver
Time constraints, workload, and/or frequency congestion 
preclude prior deviation notification. While not 
constituting an emergency, the pilot must deviate to 
remain well clear, and is required to request an amended 
clearance upon (post-maneuver) notification of deviation 
to ATC. 
14 CFR 91.123c, AIM 4-4-
1a, 4-4-10f
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Independent Variables - Primary
• Pilot requires clearance (scenarios C*A)
• If a TA is received before the “self-separation threshold” pilot follows option A: request an 
amended clearance
• If a TA has not been received by the time the “self-separation threshold” is met, pilot 
follows option A: request an amended clearance
• Pilot does not require clearance (scenarios C*B)
• `If a TA is received before the “self-separation threshold” pilot follows option A: request an 
amended clearance
• If a TA has not been received by the time the “self-separation threshold” is met, pilot 
follows option B:  notification after deviation initiation
• Each scenario will have pilots follow one or the other of these options.  
• The “self separation threshold” will be set to one of three values: 60, 90 and 120 seconds
60 sec. SST 90 sec. SST 120 sec. SST
Pilot requires 
clearance
Pilot does not 
require clearance
 
Scripted Encounters
• In each encounter, either procedure A or B will be followed
– Pseudo pilots will have a complete script of the procedural actions to take 
and the appropriate phraseology 
• If a TA is received prior to the “self-separation threshold”
– Pilot requests an amended clearance (A)
– This is the “typical” case, expected under normal traffic circumstances
• If a TA is not received by the threshold
– Pilot requests a maneuver (A) or notifies controller just after execution (B)
– This is the “atypical” case, expected when controller is too busy to provide 
additional services or cannot detect the intruder (e.g. primary target)
• If an amended clearance is received before the encounter the 
pseudo pilots follow the controller’s instructions
– This data point is essentially lost
– Clearance issued may be compared with scripted maneuvers and 
autoresolverrecommendations as an additional research finding
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I. Aircraft Maneuver and Action Scripts by Scenario
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J. Pilot Observation Sheets for each Scenario 
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K. Pseudo-Pilot Instructions 
 
Pseudo-Pilot (PP) and PP Observer Instructions 
Who the instruction applies to: 
PP = The two pseudo pilots 
PPO = the pseudo-pilot observer 
All = Both the PPs and PPO 
High Priority for Final Training and Data Collection 
1. (All) Note any maneuvers that you do not believe will resolve the conflict, and what maneuver would 
solve the conflict.  Also note the scenario time. 
2. (PPO) Write down the time at which each maneuver is executed, and what the maneuver was. Also circle 
the YES/NO to indicate whether a VFR advisory was received. If the maneuver was not executed write 
[NONE] and make a note of why (ATC already cleared conflict [ATC], noticed the scripted conflict too late 
[LATE], aircraft were just not in conflict [NC], etc.).  If ATC changed the maneuver you were intending to 
execute, write down that new maneuver and [CHANGE]: 
Maneuver Time:___________  Maneuver Executed:________________  Reason:____________ 
Additional Instructions/Reminders 
1. If a TA is received for a conflict not in the script, do the following: 
a. Acknowledge traffic in sight (manned) or detected (UAS) 
b. Follow directions from the controller, if any.  If no instructions, do not request vectors around 
traffic, just let the encounter proceed. 
2. If a scripted resolution is a rate of climb/descent, do not specifically request that rate.  Only request a 
change (greater or less) than the current rate.  
3. When to resume flight plan navigation after a resolution or deviation: 
a. If the controller was originally involved in negotiating or approving the resolution, or if they 
contacted you after you maneuvered, then request the return-to-flight-plan maneuver. 
b. If you have never talked to the controller about this deviation, the simply return to the flight 
plan. 
4. If ATC intervenes to resolve a scripted conflict, or performs any other action that has the effect of 
resolving the scripted conflict, then skip that conflict.  Make a note on the script that ATC was the reason 
no maneuver was executed. 
5. Use vector lines (2 min) to decide when to initiate a maneuver or request, not the script time.  This time 
occurs when the tips of the vectors (or any other part of them) overlap, the vector does not need to lie on 
the target itself.  Every attempt will be made to make this condition consistent with the scripted time, but 
because of unforeseen controller actions early in the simulation the two will never be perfectly 
consistent. 
6. If you have maneuvered without notification and the controller later contacts you, inform them that you 
already took XXX action to resolve the conflict (essentially the same as the post-notification procedure 
condition). 
7. When you receive a TA and the procedure is to execute the maneuver and then inform the controller, you 
should first enter and execute the maneuver.  Then immediately inform them that you have already taken 
XXX action. 
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L. Subjective Responses to Post-Run and Post-Simulation Questionnaires 
 
 
Figure L1. Responses by procedure to post-scenario question "As compared with normal real-world operations, how 
would you rate your workload during this scenario?"  (Appendix B question 5). 
 
 
 
Figure L2. Responses by procedure to post-scenario question "Did the workload and complexity of the scenario impact 
your ability to provide additional services (direct routings, traffic advisories, etc.)?" (Appendix B question 6). 
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Figure L3. Response by procedure to post-scenario questionnaire "Did you notice any ghost controller, pilot, or software 
behavior in the simulation that did not conform to your expectations or that was unlike behavior in the real world?"  
(Appendix B question 7). 
 
Figure L4. Response to post-simulation question "Did any deviations (without an amended clearance) create an adverse 
situation, for example a conflict with a third aircraft?" (Appendix C question 6).  Percentage that responded "yes" was 
29%. 
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Figure L5. Response to post-simulation question "Were deviations requested or made by unmanned aircraft more or less 
acceptable to you than those made by pilots of manned aircraft?" (Appendix C, question 9). 
 
Figure L6. Responses by alert threshold to post-scenario question "As compared with normal real-world operations, how 
would you rate your workload during this scenario?" Mean of 120-second alert threshold condition was 3.53, of 90-sec 
condition was 3.55 and of 60-sec condition was 3.42 (Appendix B question 5). 
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Figure L7. Response by alert threshold to post-scenario question "Did the workload and complexity of the scenario impact 
your ability to provide additional services (direct routings, traffic advisories, etc.)?"  Mean of 120-second alert threshold 
condition was 2.89, 90-sec condition was 2.93 and 60-sec condition is 3.25.  (Appendix B question 6).  
 
 
Figure L8. Responses by alert threshold to post-scenario question "Did you notice any ghost controller, pilot, or software 
behavior in the simulation that did not conform to your expectations or that was unlike behavior in the real world?"  
Percentage of yes responses was 47% in the 120-sec condition, 38% in the 90-sec condition and 50% in the 60-sec condition.  
Not statistically significant as evaluated with the Kruskal-Wallis test (p=0.744) (Appendix B question 7). 
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